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Abstract: In this paper, the role of the environment and physical embodiment of computational
systems for explanatory purposes will be analyzed. In particular, the focus will be on cognitive
computational systems, understood in terms of mechanisms that manipulate semantic information.
It will be argued that the role of the environment has long been appreciated, in particular in the
work of Herbert A. Simon, which has inspired the mechanistic view on explanation. From Simon’s
perspective, the embodied view on cognition seems natural but it is nowhere near as critical as
its proponents suggest. The only point of difference between Simon and embodied cognition is
the significance of body-based off-line cognition; however, it will be argued that it is notoriously
over-appreciated in the current debate. The new mechanistic view on explanation suggests that
even if it is critical to situate a mechanism in its environment and study its physical composition,
or realization, it is also stressed that not all detail counts, and that some bodily features of cognitive
systems should be left out from explanations.
Keywords: cognitive mechanisms; informational interaction; mechanistic explanation; computational
modeling
1. Introduction
A realistic approach to the computational explanation of cognitive processes assumes that they are
adequately explained by computational models because they are computational. However, in the study
of cognition, defenders of “embodied and embedded cognition”, who claim that cognition depends
essentially on interaction with the environment, have repeatedly criticized computational modeling
for ignoring physical interaction, embodiment, and the role of environment, cf. [1–6]. The biological
embodiment is supposed to exclude computational explanations. At the same time, such explanations
predominate in theoretical papers published by major journals of cognitive science [7]. Is theory in
cognitive science not up-to-date? Or maybe, the role of embodiment is actually overhyped, as some
argue [8].
The aim of this paper is to answer the question of the role of the environment and physical
embodiment in cognitive explanations of behavior, in particular when cognitive processes are
considered to be sensitive to information. In answering this question, the role of environments
as suppliers of information will be stressed, and it will be shown that current explanatory practices are
not as revolutionary or radical as they are sometimes painted. The approach defended here belongs
to the new mechanistic philosophy [9–12], which has long drawn heavily from the work of cognitive
scientists, especially the late Herbert A. Simon. At the same time, the appeal to the mechanistic
framework will be made only in the conclusion of the paper, and methodological insights could be
phrased using another account of explanatory relevance preferred by the reader.
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William Bechtel and Robert Richardson, in the second edition of their inspiring work on the
discovery of mechanisms in scientific practice, re-emphasize their stress of Simon’s work for the
new mechanism:
Simon shifted our attention to a recognition of bounded rationality as a fundamental
feature of cognition. In decision contexts generally, he argued, human beings make choices
between alternatives in light of goals, relying on incomplete information and limited
resources. As a consequence, problem-solving cannot be exhaustive: we cannot explore all
the possibilities that confront us, and the search must be constrained in ways that facilitate
search efficiency, even at the expense of search effectiveness. [13] (p. xxii)
This paper will follow suit by stressing that Simon’s methodological insights are not only
connected to his account of bounded rationality but also can be elucidated in terms of learning driven by
environments, in which cognitive mechanisms work. Although Simon’s approach is based on symbolic
models that have drifted out of fashion, and his hypotheses about conscious serial processing have
turned out to be more controversial than he probably expected, there is an interesting methodological
lesson to be drawn from his carefully planned studies. Moreover, he might have been one of the most
radical proponents of both computational and environmentally-driven explanations of cognition [14].
Certainly not appreciated is the fact that if his approach fails because environments and cognitive
problems are ill-structured [15], the situated account of cognition and ecological psychology fail for the
same reason. If Simon’s critics are right to say that there is not enough structure in the environment to
solve cognitive problems, then they simply repeat the poverty of stimulus argument, which states that
the structure of the environment is not sufficiently rich to drive solving certain cognitive problems [16].
Simon does not assume that all environments are not sufficient to solve problems, or to acquire
the skills to solve them, and his approach is strikingly different from methodological solipsism [17].
I argue that his position is much more nuanced, and his arguments about the explanatory role of the
external environment were not sufficiently analyzed in the debate on situatedness and embodiment.
For example, proponents of embodiment claim that according to Simon “understanding people as
behaving systems is going to be easier than we thought, because so much of the apparent complexity
in their behavior is due to factors external to them, and hence external to our problem” [4] (p. 209).
However, this is a huge simplification. In Simon’s view, the environment and embodiment can play
a role in cognitive explanations as long as they explain the phenomena in question. If performance
levels of experimental subjects vary, bodily and environmental factors being equal, no amount of
environmental interaction alone can explain these differences. In this paper, this argument will be
further spelled out.
In Section 2, I develop the argument that the necessary (but not sufficient) condition of being
cognitive is to be sensitive to and to process information, and show that it underlies computational
explanations in cognitive science. In Section 3, it is shown that this role of environment is crucial in
biologically plausible accounts of rationality, developed already by Simon in his theory of bounded
rationality [18]. A classical study of human task solving, performed by Simon and Newell [19],
is analyzed from the point of view of bounded rationality. Section 4 shows how Simon distinguished
two kinds of environment—internal and external—and assigned them differing roles in explanation.
It will be argued that Simon’s view is largely compatible with contemporary views on embodied
cognition—but in contrast to such views, it also focuses on what may be omitted from successful
explanatory models. In Section 5, Simon’s view on two environments will be further discussed in
terms of the mechanistic account of explanation. The paper concludes with the claim that even if it is
critical to situate a mechanism in its environment and study its physical composition, or realization,
not all detail counts, and some bodily features of cognitive systems may and should be left out from
explanations. Embodied and embedded cognition usually offers only a limited insight into cognitive
functioning, and is not a cure-all in the study of cognitive processes. Instead of assuming that bodily
and environmental factors are always crucial, one should include only those factors, external or
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internal, that make a difference to the cognitive process under study. Otherwise, one risks making
embodied cognition a kind of ideological agenda rather than an empirical hypothesis to be confirmed.
2. Cognitive Mechanisms and Their Environment
What makes cognitive systems special among other physical systems is their ability to cognize their
environments and adapt to them in a flexible manner. Still, it is difficult to say what makes a particular
process cognitive without sparking a lively debate, see e.g., [20–22]. Moreover, different fields may
study cognitive processes from distinct vantage points and by adopting different idealizations, so
there can be no overarching definition of cognition for all these fields [23]. All these problems
notwithstanding, partial insights are possible. For example, Buckner has plausibly argued that
in comparative psychology, several properties of cognitive processes cluster together [24]. As he
notices, the main property attributed to cognitive processes by comparative psychologists is behavioral
flexibility, studied in more detail by devising tests that are supposed to tease out processes characterized
by context-sensitivity, speed, class formation (in object recognition), higher-order and abstract learning,
multi-modality of sensory perception, inhibition of behavioral strategies, monotonic integration
(distinguishing dimensions along which stimuli can be ordered by increasing value), as well as
expectation generation and monitoring. While the detailed characteristics are not important for my
purposes here, one striking feature of all these processes is that they presuppose pickup and processing
of information, especially about objects that cause sensory stimuli to appear.
Although one could describe behavioral flexibility in other terms, sensitivity to information
about the environment and the organism itself is usually presupposed to underlie flexible behavioral
strategies. What makes sensitivity to information particularly attractive in this context? The main
reason is that while there could be some other reasons why behavioral strategies are not extremely
stereotyped, flexibility is not unpredictability or chaotic behavior; flexible behavior is adapted to
the current niche. It should be noted, however, that one could imagine flexibility underpinned by
a non-informational causal interaction with the environment and some rich internal structure of
a cognitive system. In such an explanation, it would remain, however, unclear why (and whether) this
structure could be appropriately flexible, i.e., responsive to the environment. In particular, the more
complex the behavior and its modifications vis-à-vis the environment, the less it is plausible to claim
that it is not underpinned by some information transfer. One particular argument that this is highly
unlikely can be found in the theorem that every good regulator must be a model of the controlled
system, i.e., be informationally related to the goals achieved by the regulator, and these goals can be
said to be situated in the environment [25] (I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for the suggestion
to discuss the work of Conant and Ashby [25] as they also talk of models of the environment. However,
a detailed comparison of their approach and Simon’s goes beyond the scope of this paper).
Instead, it seems to be implied that there is a necessary but insufficient feature of cognitive
processes: they require the processing of information. Elsewhere I have argued that as long as
the function of such mechanisms is to process information, they should qualify as computational
mechanisms [23]. Here, the mechanistic account of physical computation will only be summarily
recapped. The goal of the account is to provide criteria to decide which physical systems, if any,
qualify as computers. While there are some differences between the two mechanistic accounts of
physical computation [23,26], both may be summarized by the following: The necessary condition
for candidate physical systems is that they be mechanisms (in the sense of the new mechanistic view
on causal explanation, cf. [9–11]) whose function is to compute. The mechanism’s causal structure
should correspond strictly to a mathematical model of computation over physical vehicles specified
in a substrate-neutral way. Moreover, the computational explanation should essentially involve the
processing of information (as I have described the condition) or be usable as information (as Piccinini
has spelled it out). The rest of the conditions spelled out by mechanists simply follow from the general
methodological norms of mechanistic explanation.
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Mechanistic views on physical computation stress that not all computers process vehicles that
bear semantic value. Quite the contrary, it is easy to produce a computer that processes vehicles which
do not refer to anything outside the computer. Note: program-loaded computers process instructional
information but it is not about anything outside the computational system; cf. [27]. In particular, the
information in question may be merely structural (also called logon-information by MacKay, cf. [28]): the
only requirement is that a physical vehicle has at least one degree of freedom and its state changes
are recognized by some other physical entity. This kind of information need not be semantic, or about
anything at all.
However, defenders of the mechanistic view on physical computation are not
anti-representationalists; in other words, they do not deny that there is an important explanatory role
for representation in cognitive explanations. For one, computational mechanisms embedded in larger
control mechanisms may be tasked with processing feedback information from the environment in
order to control ongoing environmental interaction. For another, probably one of the most important
reasons why we view the brain as a computational system is that its function is to model, or represent,
the world [29].
Some claim that there is no role for semantics in computational explanations of behavior; at most
they are glosses on genuine computational explanations [30,31]. However, anti-representational
accounts remain difficult to reconcile with a broader view on the role of computation in behavior—after
all, what makes behavior adaptive, or appropriate in a given environment, is not merely computation.
It is the sensitivity to information, and that is the linchpin of ecologically valid rationality. In the
following sections, the focus will be therefore on the relationship between the use of information and
rationality, and vexed questions about mental representation will be put to one side (but see [32–34] for
mechanistic accounts of mental representation that go together well with the view presented below).
3. Simon, Ecologically Valid Rationality, and Cryptarithmetics
How do we study rationality in an ecologically valid way? Let us start with an extremely simple
agent whose behavioral complexity depends on the environment. The ant navigates through the sand;
as Herbert Simon notes, the route taken is quite complex, as he does not foresee the obstacles on his
way home:
He must adapt his course repeatedly to the difficulties he encounters and often detour
uncrossable barriers. His horizons are very close, so that he deals with each obstacle as
he comes to it; he probes for ways around or over it, without much thought for future
obstacles. It is easy to trap him into deep detours. [35] (p. 51)
To navigate home, the ant uses simple rules which may be seen as rational—not ideally rational
but rational enough to fulfill its goals. In other words, the ant may be said to display bounded
rationality, which is one of Simon’s key ideas.
In contrast to classical economics, with its highly idealized rationality of the homo economicus,
Simon opted for a behaviorally and psychologically plausible alternative. The classical account of
rationality in economics and decision theory assumes that decisions are determined by preferences over
outcomes, which are known and fixed. Decision makers are supposed to maximize their net benefits,
or utilities, by making choices that lead to the highest benefit. This model renders decision-making
instantaneous, and idealizes away any learning or developmental processes. Moreover, the basic
factors are the incentives, or the expected utilities of the outcomes [36].
In contrast, Simon claims that organisms “fall short of the ideal of ‘maximizing’ postulated
in economic theory” [18]. Instead, they adapt well enough to “satisfice”. Real decision-making in
limited agents is strikingly constrained, and enabled by “the limitations upon the capacities and
complexity of the organism” [18] (p. 129). Furthermore, the environments possess properties that
permit further simplification of the choice mechanisms in organisms. In 1956, to argue for this claim
Simon performed a systematic, mathematical exploration of two simple models that approximate ideal
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rationality in extremely simple agents. Here I skip the (fairly simple) mathematical detail and focus on
a general specification.
The first model depicts an organism that has a single need, i.e., food, and is capable of three kinds
of activity: resting, exploration, and food getting. The organism is able to see a circular portion of its
environment, whose structure is almost completely bare but there are some isolated heaps of food.
By exploring the environment, he is able to see more. The problem is how to choose a path that avoids
starvation. According to Simon, one rational way to solve the problem is to behave in the following
way: (a) explore the environment at random, watching for a food heap; (b) approach and eat the food
when spotted; (c) rest if “the total consumption of energy during the average time required, per meal,
for exploration and food getting is less than the energy of the food consumed in the meal” [18] (p. 130).
The second model involves multiple goals. For example, the agent is supposed to find not only
food but also water. However, these goals can be attained in the same way; there is no complication
if both water and food are randomly and independently distributed in the environment. Moreover,
Simon notes that very simple preference mechanisms that could prioritize goals can be built into the
agent (so that it would not die of thirst when satisfying its hunger). There might be environments in
which one resource may be a clue for the location of another. The prioritization of mechanisms can be
informed by the clues.
The models are not supposed to reflect real decision-making processes; they simply demonstrate
the possibility that agents can make rational decisions thanks to the environmental constraints
appropriately reflected in their choice mechanisms. At the same time, Simon believes that models
characterize human rationality to some extent.
The criticisms of classical accounts of rationality underwrite Simon’s negativity towards
non-classical approaches to the study of cognition. In his joint work with Alonso Vera, Simon criticizes
extreme versions of “situated action” approaches to the study of cognition [37]. In a nutshell, Vera and
Simon declare the approaches that claim that one should study behavior only in complex real-world
situations as question-begging, as no organism “ever deals with the real-world situation in its full
complexity” [37] (p. 45). In other words, while there might be rich information out there to be
picked up, organisms are only able to pick up and process a limited subset in an effective manner.
This stands in stark contrast to John Haugeland’s claim that environmental interactions are always
“high-bandwidth”, or causally very dense [4].
Simon’s account of rationality as bound by the environment is accentuated in his empirical
research on task solving, which is sometimes misleadingly characterized as “abstract” or
“over-intellectualized” [15,38]. Whereas Simon indeed studied abstract problem solving, he did
not maintain that experimental subjects solve their tasks solely by meditating on them. Quite the
contrary, the task environment was designed to constrain the degrees of freedom in human behavior,
which is necessary in order to perform replicable studies. It is worthwhile to cite five general claims
made by Newell and Simon. These claims justify the design of their experimental studies and
cognitive simulations:
1. Humans, when engaged in problem solving in the kinds of tasks we have considered, are
representable as information processing systems.
2. This representation can be carried to great detail with fidelity in any specific instance of person
and task.
3. Substantial subject differences exist among programs, which are not simply parametric variations
but involve differences of program structure, method, and content.
4. Substantial task differences exist among programs, which also are not simply parametric
variations but involve differences of structure and content.
5. The task environment (plus the intelligence of the problem solver) determines to a large extent the
behavior of the problem solver, independently of the detailed internal structure of his information
processing system [19] (p. 788).
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Behavioral studies can be performed (and replicated) because the underlying cognitive
mechanisms, according to Simon and Newell, manipulate cognitive representations (claim 2), although
there are substantial individual differences among subjects (claim 3). The focus on individual
differences makes the approach taken by Simon and Newell markedly distinct from the studies
of reasoning performed by experimental psychologists such as Wason, who averaged the results
of their studies over multiple experimental subjects [39]. However, as later studies have shown,
the assumption that experimental subjects understand the instruction unambiguously and solve their
tasks in the same way cannot be supported [40]. Moreover, it is well-known that in perceptual tasks,
individual differences are rather small and may be limited to the attention span or the individual
levels of sensory sensitivity, whereas the intellectual differences, as studied in intelligence research, are
severe [41]. Simon and Newell have also focused on developmental differences owing to the individual
learning histories of experimental subjects (claim 4). Additionally, crucially, they have claimed that the
task environment determines, to a large extent, the behavior of the experimental subject, though it is
not the only factor (claim 5). To sum up, Simon and Newell aim to explain individual differences in
performance levels in similar task environments. This means that the focus on the task environment
alone will be simply methodologically wrong: it cannot explain these differences, as it is kept equal
among subjects.
This can be easily seen in the study of cryptarithmetic problems that consist of finding the Arabic
decimal digits which correspond to letters in equations of the form SEND + MORE = MONEY or
DONALD + GERALD = ROBERT. Solving the puzzle in a brute-force manner takes, on average,
30 min. Their explanation involved building a computer simulation that allowed them to explain
and predict how individual problem solvers operated. The subject’s performance is represented
in terms of a model of an information-processing system (IPS). Its architecture embodies a number
psychological hypotheses about human problem solving, including limited short-term memory and the
serial, or sequential, nature of high-level processing. To solve a task, the IPS transforms input symbol
structures into output symbol structures that are accepted as a solution. Symbols are understood
as entities that can designate other symbol structures (rather than referring to things external to the
system; this is admittedly the most controversial claim in the theory). Transformation of symbols is
modeled in terms of production rules, expressed as conditionals whose antecedents give the criteria
that have to be fulfilled, whereas the consequents are the actions to be performed.
Before analyzing a solver’s individual performance on the task, Newell and Simon hypothesize
about the possible problem space, or spaces, in which a solution to the problem might be sought.
The problem space is a model of knowledge, in which particular locations can be attained by applying
operators to existing knowledge states. Even vast spaces can be traversed quickly if there is an effective
way of transforming knowledge states in order to achieve the goal state. As there are a number of
ways in which problem spaces can be represented, the authors methodically consider various options,
such as basic, augmented, algebraic, and so forth. These types of problem spaces correspond, as they
claim, to differences caused by learning histories. Subjects without an engineering or mathematical
background represent the problem in a simplistic way, in terms of one-to-one mapping between
characters and digits, and do not notice that the Arabic numerical notation is positional, which would
allow them to write an equation to solve. Instead, they try individual assignments one by one, which
takes more time.
Interestingly, there are computationally more effective algorithms for solving cryptarithmetic
puzzles but they are not used by human subjects because their execution is, according to Simon,
impossible under the limitations of short-term memory. Instead, people are only boundedly rational,
and commit mistakes, which means that they need to erase partial solutions, track back to previous
states of their search, and so on.
The experimental data used to build a computer simulation are taken from verbal protocols:
subjects are told to “think aloud”, or to justify the steps they are taking. However, people fail
to verbalize as fast as they think. Because of this, Newell and Simon also used eye-tracking, which
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delivered data that corresponded much closer to the proposed computational simulation. However, the
computer simulation did not include perceptual processes; these differ from symbolic problem-solving
in that that they are, according to Newell and Simon, parallel and not serial [19]. Nonetheless, subjects
utilized a blackboard as an external memory, and this made problem solving observable. Newell and
Simon state that the external memory needs to be interpreted in order to be useful (in contrast to
an internal memory) but they do not explain what makes the external memory interpreted.
The theory proposed by Newell and Simon is summarized in terms of four propositions:
1. A few, and only a few, gross characteristics of the human IPS are invariant over the task and
problem solver.
2. These characteristics are sufficient to determine that a task environment is represented (in the
IPS) as a problem space, and that problem solving takes place in a problem space.
3. The structure of the task environment determines the possible structures of the problem space.
4. The structure of the problem space determines the possible programs that can be used for problem
solving [19] (pp. 788–789).
In other words, according to Simon, one can model rational problem solving in an ecologically
valid way by building computational models of a human IPS, which will include few characteristics
invariant over tasks and subjects. The tasks are represented and solved by subjects who search for
a solution in their problem spaces, which are determined by the structure of the task environment.
In other words, one cannot abstract away from the structure of the environment in the study of
problem-solving. Human rationality rests on responsiveness to the task environment, and while
limited and bounded by scarce cognitive resources, it may be sufficient to solve tasks at hand.
4. Six Views on Embodied Cognition and Simon’s Two Environments
Embodied cognition is a broad term that covers diverse approaches to the study of cognition.
The basic claim is that the physical body of an agent is constitutively relevant to cognition; in
other words, cognitive processing involves more than the brain [42,43]. Thus, core cognition, which
essentially involves perception and action, depends on the features of the physical body.
Some proponents of embodied cognition reject computational or information-processing views
on cognition, however, and this might make their position clearly incompatible with the account
defended by Newell and Simon. For example, Lakoff states that computational models of the mind
appeal to abstract and formal computations [1]. Similar claims are made by Barrett, who insists that
human beings cannot be computers because cognition is adapted for action control [5,6]. Chemero,
in his proposal of radical embodied cognitive science, denies that minds process information [44,45].
However, the first claim is outright implausible because physical computers are not abstract entities:
for example, they can break or burn just like anything else (in contrast to abstractions such as number
1). The second claim is in no way incompatible with computationalism, and there are computers
involved in the control of real-time interaction [46]. Chemero’s claim is based on Gibson’s account
of information as picked out from the environment but not processed. What Chemero might have in
mind (although he does not elucidate it at length) is that the stimulus information is rich, and that
perception is not a process of enrichment of informationally-poor stimulus with some additional
information stored in the brain, as suggested by Marr in his influential multi-stage account of visual
processing [47]. However, computationalism is not committed to multi-stage processing and need
not rely on integration of stored information with perceptual stimuli. So at the first glance, these
rejections of information-processing models of the mind cannot be used to exclude a mechanistic view
on physical computation as physical information-processing, already sketched above. (Proponents
of embodied cognition may, of course, appeal to other arguments against the information-processing
view. I review the most popular objections to computationalism in [48], and conclude that none of
them are successful. One reason may be that cognition requires flexible action control, and that means
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that cognitive systems tend to be (sufficiently) good regulators. This cannot be achieved without some
form of information-processing, as Conant and Ashby [25] have shown.)
What these proponents of embodied cognition may however have in their minds is the symbolic
account of computation associated with Newell and Simon, as well as Fodor [49] and Pylyshyn [50]
with their reliance of the symbolic language of thought. However, the claims about the role of the
environment do not require the notion of symbol, so even Lakoff’s or Barrett’s version of embodied
cognition may be compatible with the methodological views of Simon. Nevertheless, one should
also stress that some proponents of embodied cognition are strongly committed to computationalism,
for example Clark [51] or Barsalou [52]. At the same time, for my purposes, what is important is
a common core in embodied cognition, accepted both by critics of (symbolic) computationalism and
less radical defenders of the embodied and situated cognition. This core has been identified by Wilson
who usefully distinguishes six views on embodied cognition: (1) cognition is situated; (2) cognition is
time-pressured; (3) we off-load cognitive work onto the environment; (4) the environment is part of
the cognitive system; (5) cognition is for action; (6) off-line cognition (or cognitive processes decoupled
from the current environment) is body based [53]. The first three claims accentuate the role of the
environment in cognitive processes; cognitive processing is always spatiotemporally embedded in
some environment, and needs to be adequate vis-à-vis this environment. As should be now clear, this is
also exactly what Newell and Simon claimed by saying that the structure of the task environment
determined the possible structures of the problem space; the task environment may include external
memory, which allows off-loading cognitive work onto the environment, just like the ant described by
Simon. However, the tasks studied by Newell and Simon are not so strongly time-pressured. While
problem solvers may feel pressure to solve the task as quickly as possible, it is not a matter of life
and death.
The view that the environment is part of the cognitive system (claim 4) is closely connected to
the idea of the extended mind, according to which parts of the environment that not only have causal
but also constitutive relevance for cognitive processes [54], but see [55,56] for criticisms. It may be
instructive to compare this view with the account defended by Simon. As I have already noted,
symbols written by solvers on the blackboard are considered to be their external memory, which is
distinguished from internal memory. However, it is also striking that Simon distinguishes two kinds
of environment: internal and external [57].
The external environment is rarely modeled explicitly by Simon, although he mentions that
robotic models are appropriate for the study of external environmental constraints; cf. [18]. It is rather
included in his methodology: it is the structure of the task environment that lowers the degrees of
freedom in human conduct under study [19]. However, it still leaves a lot of elbow room for the solver:
Given all the invariant structures, a human IPS is still capable of almost arbitrary behavior
in response to a task environment—everything from attempting the task to going to sleep,
arguing with the presenter of the task, redefining the task, deliberately failing, ignoring
the task, engaging in a sitdown strike for better working conditions, protesting over
something not connected with the task—and so on. The structural limits provide only that
he do these things in a certain style—not too fast, not remembering too much, using a
goal structure to keep track of whatever goals he constructs and submits himself to, and
using a problem space when the current goal confronts him with a problem he wishes
to solve [19] (pp. 864–865).
This is why Haugeland’s high-bandwidth interaction with the environment alone cannot explain
individual performance. There is residual variance that needs to be explained with factors that go
beyond physiological or bodily factors.
At the same time, on larger timescales, the external environment exerts influence on cognitive
processing: namely, adaptive devices shape themselves to their environments [19]. This is a fairly
metaphorical expression, which can be unpacked in the following way: over time, adaptive devices
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acquire capacities that allow them to solve their tasks effectively in their environments, which means
that they are able to pick up relevant information from the external environment. Simon’s metaphor
is clearly related to evolutionary studies of animal morphology as determined by the environment.
For example, Darwin famously studied finches and how their body shape was determined by the
external environment. As he wrote: “Seeing this gradation and diversity of structure in one small,
intimately related group of birds, one might really fancy that from an original paucity of birds in this
archipelago, one species had been taken and modified for different ends” [58] (pp. 379–380).
Simon’s metaphor may be thus interpreted in terms of embodied cognition quite straightforwardly
by taking a clue from Darwin. For example, Lungarella and Sporns have studied the information
flow between the shape of a robot’s body and the environment [59]. In particular, they used
mutual information and transfer entropy to discriminate non-directed and directed components
of sensorimotor coupling, which allowed them to reconstruct the information flow between the
environment and the system. Their findings are that the information flow is “(a) quantifiable and
variable in magnitude; (b) temporally specific, i.e., restricted to short temporal delays between sensory and
motor time series; (c) spatially specific, i.e., restricted to specific portions of the visual input capable of
driving motor responses; (d) modifiable with experience, e.g., in the course of value-dependent learning of
stimulus-response contingencies; and (e) dependent upon morphology, e.g., the density and distribution
of visual sensors” [59].
However, the study cited above is limited to sensorimotor coupling and does not account for
learning, so the focus of the study is the result of adapting to the environment, but not the process
itself. To use the original metaphor, it shows that the shape of the solver is relevant to solving the
problem, but not how the shape was attained. Simon has framed individual learning in the same
terms as evolution, cf. also [60], so the same elucidation should be helpful in understanding both
developmental and learning processes.
Simon stressed that the individual learning history explains why problem solvers use their
preferred representations of a given problem. Unfortunately, there are no studies on the relationship
between mathematical education and the ability to use more advanced problem spaces in solving
cryptarithmetic problems. One could perform longitudinal studies on the same individual to test
whether her puzzle-solving strategies change, and how. Advanced mathematical education allows
some subjects to write up an algebraic equation, and solving it, for a skilled person, is much less
error-prone than substituting letters one by one with digits. In more abstract terms, Simon would
claim that the subject is able to represent the problem in a new way, and some representations make
the solutions transparent.
The structure of the environment allows the solver to create new representational formats and
heuristics that make problem-solving easier. The adaptation of an organism to the environment, which
may occur as individual learning or as a result of natural selection, consists in structuring the internal
processes of the organism so that they are capable of representing the structure of the environment
well enough to solve their most important problems, at least on average (they need not be adapted
ideally). While the question of how to model this process in terms of information flow remains open,
at least two options are particularly popular in the current literature.
The first view has been forcefully defended by Friston in terms of the free energy principle [61];
in other words, organisms minimize their free energy (or entropy). Interestingly, the abovementioned
good regulator theorem, proven by Conant and Ashby [25], also presupposes that a good regulator
minimizes the entropy of the system that is regulated. Friston hypothesizes that biological systems
become models of the causal structure in their local environment, which allows them to predict
what happens next, thus countering surprising violations of those predictions. This preserves the
homeostasis of biological systems: their states remain within certain bounds. While fairly abstract,
Friston’s account has straightforward applications to cognitive problems [62,63].
The second view is more developmental, and stresses the fact that both evolution and learning do
not leave biological systems in their previous bounds [64]. One may view evolutionary transitions
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as being associated with novel means of information storage and transmission [65]. In such a view,
information does not only allow organisms to remain within certain bounds; it helps them to do some
physical work. For example, Terrence Deacon has defended an account of biological information
that stresses the role of work, and physical energy, in the semantic role of information (interestingly,
his account converges with some other pragmatic accounts of semantic information, cf. [28,66]).
These two views are not presented as an exhaustive taxonomy of all possible views (most probably
the study of morphology performed by Lungarella and Sporns falls somewhere in between). Moreover,
one may suppose that there is no single way that organisms may become informationally structured
to reflect their environments, and that quite distinct strategies are possible. These, as a result, may
require different mathematical models. For example, one can devise an artificial agent that relies on
reinforcement learning implemented by predictive coding [67], and one that uses predictive error for
reinforcement learning, but without predictive coding; one such example being the temporal difference
algorithm [68]. Therefore, multiple learning algorithms, whose structure may reflect (sometimes
slightly) differing informational relationships, may exist. Instead offering a single correct view on
learning, therefore, these two views may still make Simon’s suggestion less metaphorical.
Let me turn to the internal environment. Its role is framed in other terms. It constrains adaptivity,
not problem solving itself. Simon proposes that the ability to learn natural language, for example, is not
the result of innate constraints on language syntax, as Noam Chomsky would have it. He suggests that
it depends, instead, on general-domain learning constraints of the information-processing architecture.
While such claims remain very much debated, for my purposes the most important fact is that the
internal environment remains invariant over multiple task environments. This makes it explanatorily
highly relevant.
However, as long as morphology remains roughly constant, and temporal scales become larger,
some other forms of learning may become more important for problem solving than mere sensorimotor
coupling. After all, sensorimotor coupling cannot explain similar performances when the morphology
and sensory abilities differ. Obese people may play chess as well as anorectics do; and short-sighted
people as well as blind people do (e.g., if they have haptic stimuli).
Note that some proponents of the extended mind also stress that only parts of the environment
that remain stably or constantly connected to the cognitive system could count as constituting the
extended system [54]. However, their terminological choice is, in some way, opposite to Simon’s, even
if they appreciate Simon’s description of the ant solving navigation problems in its environment [54].
Where Andy Clark and David Chalmers see the extended mind, Simon sees the environment; and
he also considers the cognitive itself to be the (inner) environment. Even though he and Newell do
not subscribe to the Skinnerian vision of an empty organism as a black box that merely responds to
stimuli, they suggest that psychological mechanisms (constituted, in turn, by appropriate neurological
mechanisms) work only in a certain environment, and as such, are just a part of a larger equation.
These psychological mechanisms do not extend; they are complemented with sometimes ephemeral
and highly variable task environments. Notice that the classical view that the mind is extended
does not appreciate one-time or unstable contributions of the environment to cognitive tasks. Thus,
methodologically speaking, the classical extended mind is not necessarily a step in an appropriate
direction; it seems to lead one to ignore ephemeral structures that remain explanatorily and causally
relevant to the explanation of certain cognitive processes. Not everything, after all, remains invariant
in cognitive processing. (This insight has been appreciated by newer, more dynamical accounts of the
extended mind that assert that the mind can include ephemeral structures, cf. [69,70].)
Notice also two other important differences. Whereas Simon would applaud that cognition is
for action (claim 5) as long as the term action may also refer to highly intellectual activities (such as
chess playing), he does not see a particularly important role for bodily processes in cognitive processes.
Newell and Simon stress two facts: the importance of biology in understanding the constraints on
cognition, and its relative explanatory triviality:
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Man is the mirror of the universe in which he lives, all that he knows shapes his psychology,
not just in superficial ways but almost indefinitely and subject only to a few basic constraints.
[ . . . ] The universe that man mirrors is more than his culture. It includes also a lawful
physical universe, and a biological one—of which man’s own body is not the least important
part. [ . . . ] But a normal situation is precisely one in which these biological limits are not
exceeded, and it is to such normal situations that the theory of this book applies. In this
sense, the theory is a first approximation, which is to be refined by introduction of the
sensory and other biological limits as additional constraints upon behavior. [19] (p. 866)
Here Newell and Simon claim something that seems to correspond to the recent survey of
results obtained under the broad umbrella of the embodied cognition: even if embodied experimental
designs lead to interesting discoveries, the embodied cognition has little or no role in explaining
a number of cognitive processes [8]. It is precisely because in the weak sense, it is trivial that off-line
cognition is body-based: people are not made of supernatural substance, after all; and in a strong
sense, it is simply false: it is not only the body that is crucial in explaining most individual differences
in solving cryptarithmetic tasks. It is the learning and developmental histories that explain certain
representational preferences, which then lead to the choice of the problem space in a solver.
Simon stresses also that the distinction between the outer and inner environment is, to some
extent, in the eye of beholder: “There is a certain arbitrariness in drawing the boundary between
inner and outer environments of artificial systems” [35] (p. 86). The arbitrariness stems from the
fact that the outer environment constrains the structure of the inner environment, which, in turn,
constrains adaptivity. Although this may sound paradoxical or viciously circular, the idea is that
at various timescales, inner and outer factors may exert their influence, and these factors are not
entirely separable. Only by evaluating the factors that are explanatorily and predictively useful for the
phenomenon at hand can one decide what to include in the explanatory models of cognition. However,
whether the factor is purely inner or outer makes little contribution to the explanation at hand.
While the proponents of the embodied mind hold that including biological detail is crucial,
Simon and Newell stress that this detail remains largely invariant, while individual performance
varies. This simply means that some biological detail is explanatorily irrelevant and should normally
be omitted from explanations; only if one discovers certain decidedly biological factors that would
influence, say, the attention span of solvers, could it be included among crucial factors that are relevant
(and today’s neuroscience tries to discover such factors; cf. [41]). Even if the dictum “only what’s
relevant counts” seems hollow, it is actually much better methodological advice than assuming a priori
that bodily detail always counts, or that it can be always abstracted from.
5. Looking Inside and Around: Not All Detail Counts
Let me summarize the methodological insights gained from the discussion of Simon’s account of
two environments in terms of the mechanistic view on explanation. In principle, one could also defend
my conclusions in terms of the received view in the philosophy of science, namely, the covering-law
account of explanation [71], or a functional account of explanation in cognitive sciences [72]. The reader
may therefore rephrase my claims to her or his favorite account of explanation; at the same time, for the
purposes of the study of cognition, the mechanistic framework seems not only easier to apply than
the covering-law model (which would require rephrasing cognitive and neuroscientific models into
sound deductive arguments citing exceptionless laws) but also closer to other normative practices in
the current cognitive (neuro)science, which requires evidence from multiple levels of organization
to be supplied [73]. However, my purpose is not to defend the mechanistic view here (but see [23]),
but to use the account to further develop the methodological lessons.
The mechanistic account of explanation has drawn insight from scientific practice, and it has long
stressed that mechanisms, which cannot be thought of as purely reactive systems, remain subject to
modulation from the environment [74]. For this reason, the explanation has to include both the internal
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organization of the mechanism in question and the dependence of the behavior of mechanisms on the
environmental regularities.
Craver has defended the most systematic account of mechanistic explanation and spelled out
norms that satisfactory explanatory texts must satisfy [11]. The most important norm is completeness:
Complete explanatory texts “represent all and only the relevant portions of the causal structure of the
world” [11]. Subsequently, mechanists were understood to argue that “the more detail, the better” [75],
and were criticized for adopting such an unrealistic standard [76]. However, such criticism is mistaken;
mechanists defend the claim that only causally relevant detail counts [77,78]. Thus, for mechanists,
not all possible detail is even admissible in explanatory texts. This implies that there might even be
irrelevant causal interactions of a mechanism with its environment: they are irrelevant as long as they
have no influence on the phenomenon to be explained. Explaining cognitive phenomena does not
require including all detail about the situation in which the problem solver is found; some physiological
information about the solver may turn out to be useless. For example, as far as we know, facial hair has
no causal relevance for strategies adopted during solving cryptarithmetic tasks, even if facial hair may
be evidence for some cultural trends, and hence may indicate that a solver belongs to a certain social
group. However, there is no correlation between facial hair and the performance in cryptarithmetics.
The same may be true of other bodily properties or processes. Not all of them, even if they support
crucial metabolic processes, explain cognitive performance. As Newell and Simon phrased it, in normal
situations, biological constraints exert little to no influence on cognition.
Only the properties, and in particular, regularities in the environment that are causally relevant
for the performance of cognitive mechanisms, framed in terms of information processing mechanisms,
should be included in explanatory texts about cognitive phenomena. Otherwise, they are just noise.
In other words, it is crucial to include the interactions that modulate the computational mechanisms
by causing certain inputs to appear.
The mechanistic explanation of cognition is typically situated because it needs to show how
mechanisms are subject to environmental modulation. This is why researchers should look around
the mechanism in order to understand its work. The work of the mechanism may be evolutionarily
relevant: it may be an adaptation to the environment. Interestingly, for Simon, cognition is just
adapting oneself to the milieu on a smaller temporal scale; as I have argued, adaptation in general
may be understood in terms of learning, which, in turn, can be explained in terms of shaping
informational relationships. This is why some constraints on the way that cognitive mechanisms
work are informational: the information that is available and how it might be actively exploited is
a constraint on the structure of the endogenous activity of internal mechanisms.
Furthermore, surrounding mechanisms may constitute a larger system. As the work in distributed
cognition clearly shows [79,80], complex mechanisms that include both human agents, computational
artifacts, and social organization may contribute to solving complex cognitive tasks that go beyond the
capacities of a single problem solver.
The focus on how the mechanism is situated does not screen off the importance of the internal
organization. Researchers have to determine how cognitive phenomena are constituted by internal
processes and components of (neuro) cognitive mechanisms if the explanation is supposed to be causal
and mechanistic. Unless the practitioners of embodied and embedded cognition can show that they
can explain all individual differences in performance by appealing to the external environment and
bodily structures, their reliance on environmental interaction as the only explanatory factor will count
as mere ideology, whose poverty is already heavily criticized [8]. The mechanistic story, instead of
recommending symbolic models of cognition, stresses that approaches to cognition must be flexible
and pluralistic to be empirically valid. Efforts to explain all cognitive phenomena in a unified fashion
by relying on bodily and environmental structures have turned out to be futile. It is time to face reality
and embrace a radically boring hypothesis: cognition is not always as embodied and situated as it
seems; but it is never entirely dis-embodied or isolated from external influence.
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